Friday 17 September 2010

Stunningly naive?

Apologies for the lack of posting in recent weeks. Life's been pretty busy, and will continue to be so for a while, so posts may be sporadic for a while.

In the mean time, this seems almost incredible to me. Presumably the idea is that until Andrews is proven definitively guilty he can not (should not?) be penalised by being, you know, sacked.

But this is surely to confuse purely legal considerations of proof beyond reasonable doubt with the lesser levels that are required in other contexts. Even if Andrews is found not guilty of the specific offence for which he is being tried, surely he can't possibly carry on serving as a police officer? Whatever the provocation, and whatever the circumstances, you would have thought his behaviour that night would disbar him from such a role?

This raises an interesting question about the legitimacy of the police, which is likely to be based in large part on the extent to which the police follow the rules and procedures laid down to govern their behaviour. But I don't think this should be taken to mean a rigid and narrowly legalistic rule following - of the type that seems to be behind the decision to carry on with full pay - but a more subtle adherence to a set of commonly accepted norms and ethical principles.

Even if Andrews is eventually cleared, the damage to public trust in the police (although the importance of this type of events can be exaggerated), and to police legitimacy, is likely to have already occurred, since his actions clearly transgress some pretty obvious moral principles and, I suspect, being seen as being profoundly unfair by the public. Such a sense will only be heightened by rigid adherence to regulation over the matter of his pay.

If police are serious about taking account of public opinion, and building trust and legitimacy by improving public perceptions of fairness and demonstrating that police operate within a just moral framework, these are the type of questions that will need to be addressed. Is fairness to be found in 'the rules', or in a more fluid consideration of fairness, justice and what is ethical in a given situation? Which is not to say of course that extant rules can't be adapted in the light of developing understandings, or made less rigid such that events such as this can be avoided.

No comments:

Post a Comment